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Abstract
This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to
testing the in￿ uential Grossman and Helpman ￿protection for sale￿model of political
economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with
protection occuring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is
simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for
sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than
previously thought.
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11 Introduction
The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of "Protection for Sale" (PFS) has become
the most in￿ uential one in the political economy of trade over the past decade. It is an
equilibrium model of protection which explicitly accounts for lobbying from industries to
in￿ uence government. Politically organized industries are assumed to propose campaign
contribution bid functions that specify the relationship between campaign contribution
and tari⁄. Given those bids from industries, the government chooses the tari⁄s so as to
maximize its objective function, a weighted sum of the campaign contribution and the
welfare of the voters. The PFS model provides a clear-cut prediction on the relationships
between the level of protection and the import penetration ratio: protection is positively
related to the import penetration for politically unorganized industries, but negatively
related for politically organized ones. A number of studies have tested this prediction.
The ￿rst few studies are Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000) (GM and GB respectively from here on). While they used the U.S. data, Mitra et
al. (2002) and McCalman (2004) used Turkish and Australian data, respectively. Findings
in these studies are consistent with the key prediction made by the PFS framework.
Recently, researchers have extended the original PFS model in various directions by
incorporating ￿rm size (Bombardini, 2004), foreign and domestic lobbies (Gawande and
Krishna, 2004), lobbying of both upstream and down stream producers (Gawande and
Krishna, 2005), and labor unions and labor immobility (Matschke and Sherlund, 2006).
While the original model accounts for tari⁄s, its quota version was also constructed and
estimated (Facchini et al., 2006). These extensions typically leave the basic predictions
of the PFS model unchanged and seem to provide more evidence in support of the PFS
model.
Despite much evidence favoring the PFS model, the extent to which past studies did a
2stringent job of testing the PFS model is an open question. This results from the fact that
most past studies did not formally test the PFS model.1 Past studies simply estimated the
protection equation derived by the PFS model and examined whether the signs of the key
coe¢ cients follow the pattern predicted by the model. However, such an estimation exercise
was typically conducted in the absence of a well-speci￿ed alternative model.2 Therefore,
it is possible that some alternative model, not the PFS model, may be the correct one.
This paper ￿rst shows that a simple setting, where government provides protection
for politically organized industries when imports exceed a trigger level (which we call the
"Surge Protection" model), is also consistent with the estimates in the literature. In
particular, we simulate a simple equilibrium model of domestic consumption and imports,
where imports in industries are subject to an exogenously and uniformly set threshold: if
import demand exceeds this threshold either because of supply or demand shocks, then
there is pressure for protection. This pressure is more likely to get transformed into actual
protection if the industry is organized. In fact, we take an extreme position here and
assume that the industry is protected, i.e., the threshold becomes a quota, only if it is
organized. Political organizations are set exogenously and randomly. Obviously, in this
simple model, there is no strict PFS e⁄ect. Parameters are set so that the simulated data
roughly match the basic statistics of the actual data. Then, we estimate the key equation
1This problem was noticed by Goldberg and Maggi (1999); they mentioned that ￿(s)trictly speaking, we
do not test the G-H model, because we do not have a well-speci￿ed alternative hypothesis￿(p.1135).
2Notable exceptions are Eicher and Osang (2002) and Gawande (1998) who formally tested the PFS
model. However, in our view, the results are far from satisfactory. Eicher and Osang (2002) is a good
example to make our point. They compared the tari⁄ equation derived by the PFS model and that of the
Tari⁄ Function approach by using the Davidson-McKinnon non-nested hypothesis test, concluding that the
results are in favor of the PFS model. While this kind of formal approach could be very helpful in making
model comparisons, we believe the simplistic approach traditionally being followed can be more misleading
than helpful. Even though the tari⁄ equation which they estimated is su¢ cient for the estimation of the
structural parameters, it is a small part of the entire PFS model or the Tari⁄ Function model. Hence,
testing the tari⁄ equation only could lead to misleading results; to correctly execute the non-nested model
speci￿cation tests, one needs to impose all the restrictions of the model on the data. This involves the full
solution of the model, which is di¢ cult for the PFS model, and to the best of our knowledge, has not been
done in the literature.
3of the PFS model on the arti￿cial data following the procedures by GM and GB. We ￿nd
that coe¢ cient estimates are consistent with the PFS paradigm. Furthermore, similar
￿ndings are obtained in the analogous tari⁄-setting version of the model. Our results
therefore suggest that estimation of the protection equation, even though su¢ cient for all
the structural parameters, is not enough to test the validity of the PFS model against
alternatives such as the simple Surge Protection (SP) model.
To make our point as clear as possible, we use the SP model because to us it seems a
simple way to model the institutional side of trade policy. In all countries, membership
in the GATT/WTO restricts the ability of countries to protect domestic industries except
under certain circumstances, for example, as a safeguard measure, or under anti-dumping
law, or in the 80￿ s as a voluntary export restraint. Though injury has to be shown, such
institutional measures would allow protection more easily when industries are threatened
with competition, i.e., when imports surge. Moreover, it is also likely to be easier for
organized industries to obtain such protection as it involves jumping through some hoops
and because they can more easily overcome the usual free rider problems. This idea is
captured in the simplest form by the SP model. We use arti￿cial data for estimation,
thereby abstracting ourselves from the intricacies of the actual data. In that sense, the
paper is in the same spirit as the "counterfactual estimation" in Keller (1998), where he
created an arti￿cial trade pattern that was not related to R&D spillovers and "veri￿ed"
the model of international R&D spillovers.
Our results help explain some puzzle in previous work. Most studies that we are aware
of found that political economy factors seem to matter little; the estimate of the weight on
contribution relative to welfare placed by the government is typically very low.3 However,
3The estimated low weight on contributions might be partly attributed to the fact that data on con-
tributions is not actually used in the estimation procedures of most previous studies. The only paper we
know that actually used contribution data directly is Kee et al. (2005). They assumed that lobbies have
a ￿rst mover advantage over government as is the norm in this literature, and looked at foreign lobbying
4given that contributions are small relative to their e⁄ects on ￿rm pro￿ts and welfare, one
would expect the government to put a reasonably high weight on contributions, because in
the PFS model, equilibrium contributions by a group keep the government as well o⁄ as in
the absence of the lobby group, i.e., just compensate the government.4 Our results simply
suggest that the supposedly low values for the weight on contributions obtained by past
studies can be thought of as just a misinterpretation of the parameter estimates; a simpler
model than the PFS framework yields similar estimated coe¢ cients, but without the strict
PFS interpretation.
Given that ￿ndings in the literature favor the PFS model and the SP model, one
question naturally arises: which model is more plausible? It is important to note that the
PFS model is not supported by a recent study by Imai et al. (2008). They use quantile
regression and IV quantile regression to examine the relationship between the level of
protection at various conditional quantiles and the inverse import penetration ratio. Using
the data from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), they provide evidence that at low
quantiles of protection measure, the estimated coe¢ cient on the inverse import penetration
ratio is zero, and it becomes negative at higher quantiles.5 Their results are inconsistent
with the PFS model, as at high quantiles of protection where industries should be mostly
politically organized, protection should be positively related to inverse import penetration
ratio.
To examine whether the SP model is empirically plausible, this paper follows Imai et al.
in the US for preferential access (which reduces tari⁄s to zero or leaves them unchanged) with world prices
given. As a result, the welfare cost to the US is the loss of tari⁄ revenue. This loss is, in essence, compared
to the contributions received to obtain a weight on contributions relative to welfare. Their results suggest
that the government seems to value contributions ￿ve times more than welfare: a vast di⁄erence from the
results using either the GM or GB approach!
4See Rodrik (1995) for an early survey of political economy models in trade and Gawande and Krishna
(2003) for a recent one of the empirical work in the area.
5From now on, we commit a minor abuse of de￿nition to denote "quantile" for "conditional quantile
given inverse import penetration ratio."
5(2008) and runs the quantile regression and IV quantile regression on the data simulated
from the model. The estimated coe¢ cients are zero at low quantiles and negative at
higher quantiles, having the same sign as those of the actual data. We thus conclude that
the SP model better describes the relationship between the protection and inverse import
penetration ratio at various quantiles than the PFS model.
The paper proceeds as follows. The PFS model is brie￿ y laid out in the next section.
Section 3 develops the SP model, which we calibrate to broadly match the data. We then
generate data from it. Section 4 runs the standard regressions on the simulated data and
shows that the standard results are obtained despite the absence of any strict PFS e⁄ects.
Section 5 veri￿es that our results go through even with a tari⁄ version of the SP model.
Section 6 conducts some robustness checks. Section 7 then explains why this is happening.
Section 8 examines and discusses which model is more consistent with the data. Section 9
concludes.
2 The PFS Model and Its Estimation
2.1 The PFS Model
The exposition in this section relies heavily on Grossman and Helpman (1994). There is a
continuum of individuals, each of in￿nitesimal size. Each individual has preferences that
are linear in the consumption of the numeraire good and are additively separable across
all goods. As a result, there are no income e⁄ects and no cross price e⁄ects in demand
which comes from equating marginal utility to own price. On the production side, there is
perfect competition in a speci￿c factor setting: each good is produced by a factor speci￿c
to the industry, ki in industry i; and a mobile factor, labor, L. Thus, each speci￿c factor
is the residual claimant in its industry. The PFS model is characterized by a freely traded
6Ricardian numeraire (i.e., unlike the other sectors which use mobile labor and a speci￿c
factor, only labor is used in production of the numeraire and the world price ties down
the domestic price) which insures that sectors are not linked in production via the market
for the only mobile factor. It is this combination that allows the "general equilibrium"
model to be treated essentially as a sum of partial equilibrium sectors.6 Some industries
are politically organized (i.e., form lobby groups), and being organized or not is exogenous
to the model. Tari⁄ revenue is redistributed to all agents in a lump sum manner. Owners
of the speci￿c factors in organized industries can make contributions to the government
to try and in￿ uence policy if it is worth their while. Government cares about both the
contributions made to it and social welfare and puts a relative weight of ￿ on social welfare,
W(p) where p is the domestic price and equals the tari⁄ vector plus the world price p￿7.
The timing of the game is as follows: ￿rst, lobbies simultaneously bid contribution
functions that specify the contributions made contingent on the trade policy adopted (which
determines domestic prices). The government then chooses what to do to maximize its own
objective function. In this way, the government is the common agent that all principals
(i.e., lobby groups) are trying to in￿ uence. Such games are known to have a continuum of
equilibria.8 By restricting agents to bids that are ￿truthful￿so that their bids have the same
curvature as their welfare, a unique equilibrium is obtained.9 The equilibrium outcome
is as if the government was maximizing the weighted sum of the welfare of politically
unorganized industries and that of the organized industries with a greater weight on the
6We are grateful to the anonymous referee for providing some important insights of the PFS model.
7For the remainder of the paper, vectors are written in bold letters.
8Given the bids of all other lobbies, each lobby wants a particular outcome to occur, namely, the one
where it obtains the greatest bene￿t less cost. This can be attained by o⁄ering the minimal contribution
needed for that outcome to be chosen by the government. However, what is o⁄ered for other outcomes
(which is part of the bid function) is not fully pinned down as given other bids, it is irrelevant. However,
bids by an agent at other outcomes a⁄ect the optimal choices of other lobbies and as their behavior a⁄ects
her in return, multiplicity arises naturally. Uniqueness is obtained by pinning down the bids at all outcomes
to yeild the same payo⁄ as at the desired one.
9For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
7welfare of organized industries. Thus, equilibrium tari⁄s can be found by maximizing




where J0 is the set of politically organized industries and the welfare of agents in industry
j is




where ￿j(pj) is producer surplus in industry j, lj is labor employed in industry j (wage
is unity in equilibrium and hence labor income equals lj), Nj=N is the share of owners of
industry j speci￿c factor in total population, while T(p)+S(p) is the sum of tari⁄revenue
and consumer surplus in the economy.
This is the great charm of the PFS model: not only does it cleanly model where both
the demand and the supply of protection are coming from, but the results can be derived
from a simple maximization exercise! Small wonder it is so popular.
Di⁄erentiating Wi(p) with respect to pj gives10
xj(pj)￿ij + ￿i
￿





where ￿ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise, ￿i is the share of industry i speci￿c factor owners,
m0
j(pj) is the derivative of the demand for imports, and xj(pj) = ￿0
j(pj) denotes the supply




10This follows from the derivative of consumer surplus from good j with respect to pj being equal to
￿dj(pj), where dj(pj) is the demand for good j:



















xj(pj)(Ij ￿ ￿L) + (pj ￿ p￿
j)m0
j(pj)(￿ + ￿L) = 0,
where
P
i2J0￿i = ￿L, the share of owners of speci￿c factors in organized industries, and
P
i2J0￿ij = Ij is unity if j is organized and zero otherwise. Now, using the fact that
(pj ￿ p￿
j) = tjp￿















mj(pj) and ej = ￿m0
j(pj)
pj
mj(pj): This is the basis of the following key equation,










Note that ￿ = [￿￿L=(￿ + ￿L)] < 0, ￿ = 1=(￿ + ￿L) > 0, and ￿ + ￿ > 0; protection is
positively related to zj=ej if the industry is politically organized, but otherwise negatively
related to it. An even stronger prediction is that zj and ej do not enter separately once
their ratio is controlled for.
2.2 Estimation Methods in GM (1999) and GB (2000)










9The error term, ￿j, is interpreted as the composite of variables potentially a⁄ecting pro-
tection that may have been left out, and the measurement error of the dependent variable.
Both GM and GB used the coverage ratios for non-tari⁄ barriers (NTBs) as tj instead of
the tari⁄ itself. GB estimated a variant of equation (3) together with the other equations
which determine the political contribution and the inverse import penetration ratio. Their
protection equation also accounts for protection on intermediate goods and includes as
explanatory variables the tari⁄and NTBs on intermediates goods used by the industry. As
zj and Ij may be endogenous in equation (3), GB used a nonlinear IV estimation technique
proposed by Kelejian (1971).
GM explicitly considered the corner solution of the protection measure on the LHS. Us-
ing full information maximum likelihood, they estimated the following system of equations.
First, the ￿true level of protection￿in industry i, t￿





= ￿zi + ￿Iizi + ￿i. (4)
The true protection level is assumed to be a multiple of the coverage ratio which lies
between zero and unity (to account for the boundedness of the coverage ratio in the data):
ti = 1
￿t￿
i if 0 < t￿
i < ￿,
= 0 if t￿
i ￿ 0,
= 1 if t￿
i ￿ ￿,
(5)
where ￿ is exogenously set at the value 1, 2, or 3.12 Domestic production to import ratios
11Note that ei is moved to the left hand side to alleviate concerns about its endogeneity.
12There is no reason for ￿ not to be less than unity as quotas may be barely binding.
10are related to a variety of factors in
zi = &0
1R1i + u1i, (6)
and whether the industry is politically organized is modelled as
Ii = D(&0
2R2i + u2i > 0), (7)
where D(￿) is an indicator function, and R1i and R2i are vectors of exogenous variables.
Both GM and GB found that the key parameters ￿ and ￿ have the predicted signs and
are statistically signi￿cant. They also found that the estimate of ￿ is very high (70 in GM
and 3715 in GB), suggesting that the government puts a very low weight on contributions.
3 A Simple Model of Imports (Surge Protection Model)
We now develop a simple model of imports that we will simulate. Our model has to have
several features to match the key statistics of the data. First, in the data some industries
are politically organized and others are not. In our model we simply assume political orga-
nization is randomly determined. Second, in the data some politically organized industries
are protected by quota and others are not. To capture that in a simple way, we assume that
the import quota will bind for politically organized industries whose equilibrium imports
exceed some threshold level.
Consider the domestic and foreign goods equilibrium without quota. For each industry
i and subindustry j, there are two types of goods: domestic and foreign goods. To make
matters simple, we assume that each good￿ s demand depends only on its own price and
random shocks and that home is the only source of demand. Let xH
ij be the equilibrium
quantity of home goods in industry i subindustry j, and let pH
ij be its equilibrium price.
11The equilibrium is described by the demand and supply equations. The demand for
industry i subindustry j of the home good depends on a constant, the price of the good,
and random terms as follows:
lnxHd
ij = ahd1 + ahd2 lnpH
ij + xhdi + uhdij. (8)
Similarly, the supply of the same good is given by
lnxHs
ij = ahs1 + ahs2 lnpH
ij + xhsi + uhsij. (9)
The random terms xhdi and xhsi are industry speci￿c demand and supply shocks, and
hence, common across all subindustries, while uhdij and uhsij are subindustry speci￿c
demand and supply shocks and are idiosyncratic to each subindustry. All shocks are
assumed to be i.i.d. with normal distributions though the parameters of the distribution
di⁄er. For all i, xhdi (xhsi) has mean 0 and standard deviation ￿xhd (￿xhs). Similarly, for





Similarly, let import demand be given by
lnxMd
ij = amd1 + amd2 lnpM
ij + xmdi + umdij, (11)
and supply by
lnxMs
ij = ams1 + ams2 lnpM
ij + xmsi + umsij. (12)
As before, the random terms xmdi, xmsi, umdij, and umsij are industry and subindustry
12speci￿c demand and supply shocks. They are distributed i.i.d. normally with means zero





We assume that there are nt industries and each industry has nj subindustries. Each
subindustry ij is politically organized with probability Poi. We allow for some variation
in the political organization probability across industries: Poi = 0:9 with probability 0:3,
Poi = 0:8 with probability 0:2, Poi = 0:7 with probability 0:2, and Poi = 0:1 with prob-
ability 0:3. This is done to ensure that there is su¢ cient variation in the numbers of
subindustries that are politically organized within industries. If we had only one prob-
ability of political organization for every industry, say :6, the fraction of industries that
are politically organized will be clustered around :6. We simulate political organization by
generating a (0;1) uniformly distributed random variable upi, and generate independently
another (0;1) uniformly distributed random variable uoij. If upi ￿ 0:3, then Iij = 1 if
uoij ￿ 0:1 and Iij = 0 otherwise. If 0:3 < upi ￿ 0:5, then Iij = 1 if uoij ￿ 0:7 and Iij = 0
otherwise. If 0:5 < upi ￿ 0:7, then Iij = 1 if uoij ￿ 0:8 and Iij = 0 otherwise. Finally, if
0:7 < upi, then Iij = 1 if uoij ￿ 0:9 and Iij = 0 otherwise.
We simulate the output and prices of each industry by ￿rst drawing nt industry (import)
demand and supply shocks and for each industry, drawing nj subindustry (import) demand
and supply shocks. Then, given these shocks and parameters of the (import) demand and
supply equations, we compute the equilibrium price and quantities for each subindustry ij:
We now introduce a uniform quota level ^ Q for politically organized subindustries. The
quota becomes binding in subindustry ij if the equilibrium output for the foreign goods
exceeds ^ Q. Let d
q
ij be the indicator for a binding quota. That is, if xMe
ij for subindustry
ij exceeds ^ Q; then actual imports, xM
ij , equal ^ Q and d
q





ij = 0. One way of interpreting this is that there is a trigger level of imports, ^ Q, above
which the relevant agency would restrict imports if asked, but only politically organized
agencies ask for such protection. In other words, that there are provisions for preventing a
surge of imports, but only organized industries can actually make use of these provisions
perhaps because they can overcome the usual free rider problems.
The variables that we use in the estimation are constructed as follows. We ￿rst ag-
gregate subindustry output to the industry level. Total industry equilibrium outputs for



















That is, coverage ratio is the fraction of industry output where quota is binding. The







= 1 + zi.
We also derive the political organization dummy of industry i; Ii, as follows:








In other words, we call industry i politically organized if more than half of its subindustries
are politically organized.
We choose the parameters of the model so that the simulation is reasonably close to
the actual data in several dimensions. The parameters of the home goods demand and
14supply equations are: ahd1 = 3:6, ahd2 = ￿1:3, ahs1 = 3:0, ahs2 = 1:4, amd1 = 1:0,
amd2 = ￿1:5027, ams1 = 1:0, and ams2 = 1:0. The import demand elasticity, i.e.,
￿amd2, is set at the mean of the industry import demand elasticity from the estimation
of Shiells et al. (1986). Furthermore, we set ￿xhd = ￿xhs = 2:0, ￿xmd = ￿xms = 0:48,
￿uhd = ￿uhs = 0:2, and ￿umd = ￿ums = 0:05.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Simulation Data
Political organization frequency 0:626 0:680
NTB positive 0:541 0:533
Average log output/import ratio 2:354 2:783
Std. deviation of log output/import ratio 1:347 1.620
In Table 1, we compare the simulation of the model to the data used in GB. The
summary statistics of the simulation is based on 1000 arti￿cially generated industries, each
having 6 subindustries.13 The model matches the average political organization, NTB
coverage ratio, log output/import ratio, and the standard deviation of log output import
ratio reasonably closely.
4 Estimating the Protection Equation Using Simulated Data
Using the data simulated from the SP model, we now estimate the PFS protection equation
following the procedures of both GB and GM.
13Note that the simulation size is set to be much larger than the sample size of the GB￿ s data, 242. This
avoids ￿nite sample variation of the sample average; the average over large sample would represent the
stochastic model more accurately than that of 242 sample.
154.1 OLS-IV Regression











where we scale variables by dividing by 10000 as done by GB. Importantly, we use 1 + zi,
not zi, as GB and GM use consumption (which equals domestic production plus imports
in the standard homogeneous good model) relative to imports, not production relative to
imports. Thus, they in e⁄ect use (1 + zi) and we follow their lead for comparability. Note
that due to the presence of the interaction term, Ii(1 + zi); this choice of variable results
in some mis-speci￿cation which could a⁄ect the estimates of ￿ and ￿ as well as ￿0. The
impact of using one versus the other turns out to be quite small in GM but larger in our
model. We discuss more on this when presenting our maximum likelihood results.
We use two sets of instrumental variables. The ￿rst set of instruments includes the
exogenous home demand and supply shocks and political organization shocks: xhdi, xhsi,
and upi (3SLS1). The second set includes these three instruments, their square terms, and
interactions (3SLS2). The simulation sample size (i.e., the number of industries) is chosen
to be 200 which is close to that used in both GB and GM. Each industry is assumed to
have 6 subindustries.
Columns 3-5 in Table 2 present the estimation results of OLS, 3SLS1, and 3SLS2,
respectively. All the parameter estimates as well as their standard errors are the average
of 10 simulation/estimation exercises. Notice that in all the estimates, ￿ is negative and
signi￿cant, ￿ is positive and signi￿cant, and the sum of the two coe¢ cients is positive,
just as the PFS model predicts. While our parameter estimates are an order of magnitude
16Table 2: OLS-IV Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GB GM OLS 3SLS1 3SLS2 OLS 3SLS1 3SLS2
￿0 ￿0:042 0:315 0:312 0:310 0:306 0:291 0:304
(0:017) (0:025) (0:038) (0:027) (0:011) (0:017) (0:012)
￿ ￿3:088 ￿0:0093 ￿28:1 ￿95:8 ￿47:3 ￿26:6 ￿101:0 ￿58:8
(1:532) (0:0040) (7:91) (22:9) (12:3) (3:56) (11:2) (5:68)
￿ 3:145 0:0106 35:2 141:4 66:8 35:3 155:6 77:1
(1:575) (0:0053) (9:05) (31:3) (15:8) (3:96) (14:9) (7:10)
￿ 3715 70:43 335:15 73:11 166:50 282:28 63:64 128:98
￿L 0:9819 0:883 0:8308 0:6761 0:6854 0:7540 0:6494 0:6981
Nobs 242 107 200 200 200 1000 1000 1000
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (3)-(5), the results are the average of
10 simulation/estimation exercises. GB is from the ￿rst column in Table 3A (p.145). GM is
from the ￿rst column in Table 1 (p.1145).
larger than those of GB (column 1), they are close to those of GM (column 2).14 These
estimates are also close to those estimated for the simulated data following the procedure
of GM, as will be prsented later.
As the sample size of 200 is a bit small, the IV estimates may be subject to small
sample bias. To see if there is a signi￿cant bias in the mean, we also run the same sim-
ulation/estimation exercise once with the simulation sample size of 1000. The results are
reported in columns 6-8 of Table 2. The estimates do di⁄er as expected, but again follow
the patterns predicted by the PFS model. It should be stressed that all of these results are
obtained in spite of the fact that the data comes from a simple model where the quota is set
exogenously at a uniform level in politically organized subindustries, the import elasticity
is set constant across all industries, and political organization is completely exogenous to
the system ￿a much less restrictive model than the PFS model.
14Note that we need to divide our coe¢ cients by 10000 to make them comparable to GM￿ s.
174.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Next we follow GM and assume the error terms of equations (4), (6), and (7) are jointly
normally distributed: (￿i;u1i;u2i) ￿ N(0;￿).15 We use full-information maximum like-
lihood to estimate the parameters of the model. The instruments for (1 + zi) are the
exogenous home demand and supply shocks and political organization shocks: R1i =
(xhdi;xhsi;upi). Also, the instruments for the political organization dummy are the ex-
ogenous demand and supply shocks as well as the political organization shocks: R2i =
(xhdi;xhsi;xmdi;xmsi;upi). Again, we conduct 10 simulation/estimation exercises with
the sample size of 200 and then take the average of those results.
Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GM GM-A3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
￿0 ￿0:2545 0:178 ￿0:435 0:127 ￿0:393
(0:241) (0:070) (0:127) (0:033) (0:059)
￿I 0:3851 0:951 0:820
(0:347) (0:156) (0:071)
￿ ￿0:0093 ￿0:0092 ￿0:007 ￿0:010 ￿0:003 ￿0:012 ￿0:015 ￿0:004
(0:0040) (0:0044) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
￿ 0:0106 0:0089 0:011 0:012 0:003 0:019 0:020 0:006
(0:0053) (0:0089) (0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
￿ 70:43 88:46 83:62 396:4 51:57 48:56 163:03
￿L 0:883 0:651 0:867 1:033 0:633 0:748 0:656
l ￿972:0 ￿968:6 ￿950:2 ￿4755:9 ￿4749:2 ￿4685:7
Nobs 107 107 200 200 200 1000 1000 1000
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ￿I is the coe¢ cient on Ii. l is the log-likelihood. In columns
(3)-(5), the results are the average of 10 simulation/estimation exercises. GM is from the ￿rst column
in Table 1 (p.1145). GM-A3 is from Table A3 (p.1152).
Column 3 of Table 3 presents the result when taking ￿ = 1 (Model 1). ￿ is negative
and signi￿cant, ￿ is positive and signi￿cant, and their sum is positive, which is totally
consistent with the PFS model and also in line with those of GM (column 1). In Model
15For nomalization, the variance of u2i is set to one.
182, we add a constant term to equation (4). The estimates of ￿ and ￿ are nearly the same
as before, while the intercept is found to be positive and signi￿cant. Similar results are
obtained when the sample size is increased to 1000 (see columns 6-7).
Model 3 further adds the political organization dummy to Model 2, allowing the in-
tercept to di⁄er for organized and unorganized industries. As column 5 indicates, the
intercepts di⁄er in sign: positive for organized industries and negative for unorganized
ones. ￿ and ￿ are found to be insigni￿cant. However, they both become signi￿cant when
the sample size increases to 1000 (column 8). Overall, the results are consistent with the
PFS model: ￿ is negative and signi￿cant, ￿ is positive and signi￿cant, and their sum is
positive. These ￿ndings are robust to the inclusion of the constant term and the political
organization dummy.
One small inconsistency is worth noting. In Model 3, it is found that the constant term
is negative and the coe¢ cient on the political organization dummy is positive. If the true
model is equation (4) but we use z￿
i = 1 + zi instead of zi, then the estimating equation






i ￿ 1) + ￿Ii (z￿
i ￿ 1) + ￿i
= ￿￿ ￿ ￿Ii + ￿z￿
i + ￿Iiz￿
i + ￿i.
Because ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0, the constant term should be estimated to be positive and the
coe¢ cient on the political organization dummy to be negative. However, that is not the
case either in our results or GM￿ s and in this sense, one could argue that our and GM￿ s
results are not in line with the PFS model.
It is also noteworthy that there are some discrepancies between our and GM￿ s ￿ndings.
First, the constant term and the coe¢ cient on the political organization dummy are sig-
19ni￿cant in Model 3 (columns 5 and 8), while they are not in GM (column 2). GM￿ s small
sample size (107), which results in large standard errors, may explain this discrepancy. An-
other possible reason is that the simulated data and the actual data di⁄er in the variations
in the dependent variable and the import penetration ratio. More variation exists in the
dependent variable in the data than in our simulated data, as we keep e constant. The
data on the inverse import penetration ratio in GM is clustered away from origin, since US,
a large country, has a low ratio of imports to domestic production in most industries. As a
result, greater variation in the dependent variable is being explained by a small variation
in the explanatory ones in GM, leading to the insigni￿cance of the constant term in GM.
The second discrepancy is that adding the constant and dummy for organization a⁄ects




ei = ￿0 + ￿IIi + ￿ (1 + zi) + ￿Ii (1 + zi) + ￿i,
then the omission of Ii will result in overestimate of ￿ (as occurs in Table 3) due to
the positive correlation between Ii and Ii (1 + zi). The correlation is smaller in the data
(0:105) than the one in the simulation (0:325), which explains why our results change more
than those of GM. The higher correlation in the simulated data is because of the uniform
quota level; when quota is binding for a subindustry, its import is constant. We ￿nd it
noteworthy that even in the simple setting, we obtain a signi￿cant and negative value for
￿ and a signi￿cant and positive value for ￿ despite allowing for di⁄erent intercepts for
organized and unorganized industries as required by the PFS model when 1 + zi is used
instead of zi!
205 Tari⁄s instead of Quotas
Although most of the empirical work estimating the PFS model use NTB￿ s as proxies for
tari⁄s, there are some notable exceptions such as McCalman (2004) who used Australian
data on tari⁄s. In this section, we simulate a simple equilibrium model of trade with ex-
ogenously determined tari⁄levels, which has the same spirit as our equilibrium model with
quotas. We solve the model and estimate the protection equation using the simulated data.
As before, equations (8)-(10), and (11)-(13) de￿ne the demand, supply, and equilibrium
for domestic goods and imports respectively.
The parameterization is the same as in the quota case except for the inclusion of the
uniform tari⁄ t in the import demand equation. We set a uniform import tolerance level
^ Q for politically organized subindustries. We assume that if the equilibrium output for the
foreign goods exceeds ^ Q, then government imposes an uniform tari⁄ t = 0:1. Otherwise,
the tari⁄ is set to be 0. Let dt
ij be the indicator that takes on the value of one if the tari⁄
is positive. That is, dt
ij = 1 if xMe
ij exceeds ^ Q and dt
ij = 0 and xM
ij = xMe
ij , otherwise. For
subindustries with positive tari⁄s, the demand equation becomes as follows:
lnxMd





+ xmdi + umdij.
Equilibrium under the tari⁄ is computed by equalizing subindustry demand and sup-
ply. The output, (1 + zi), and political organization for each industry are computed by
aggregating over subindustries, just as in the quota model. The industry level tari⁄ is the
simple average of the subindustry tari⁄s, ti =
Pni
j=1 tij=ni.
Generating data from the model, we estimate the following equation by OLS and 3SLS:
ti
1 + ti







21Table 4: Regression Results: A Model with Tari⁄s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 3SLS1 3SLS2 OLS 3SLS1 3SLS2
￿0 0:051 0:049 0:049 0:049 0:046 0:048
(0:004) (0:006) (0:004) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
￿ ￿4:927 ￿16:04 ￿7:753 ￿4:504 ￿16:72 ￿6:792
(1:310) (3:84) (2:02) (0:585) (1:90) (0:948)
￿ 5:482 24:34 11:16 5:399 26:77 13:05
(1:540) (5:40) (2:68) (0:669) (1:62) (1:22)
￿ 2285:4 427:4 984:9 1872:3 373:0 765:5
￿L 0:939 0:659 0:675 0:844 0:625 0:674
Nobs 200 200 200 1000 1000 1000
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(3), the re-
sults are the average of 10 simulation/estimation exercises.
Estimation results are presented in Table 4. The results in columns 1-3 are the average
of 10 simulation/estimation exercises with the sample size of 200, while those in columns
4-6 are based on the sample size of 1000. Estimates are fully consistent with the PFS
model, although the simple tari⁄ model from which we generate data is quite di⁄erent
from the PFS one. Qualitatively similar results (available upon request) are obtained
when we estimate the model by the maximim likelihood.
Our ￿ndings have an important implication for a puzzle in the literature: ￿ is estimated
to be "too high" (i.e., the estimated weight on contributions is "too low"). Note that as
Table 4 shows, our estimates of ￿ are high just as those in the literature. This is also ob-
served in the model with quotas (see Tables 2-3). As parameters in our models do not have
any strict PFS interpretation, our results suggest that the strict PFS interpretation being
put on the parameter estimates in previous studies may be misplaced; the supposedly low
value for the weight on contributions may be merely a misinterpretation of the parameter
estimates.
226 Some Robustness Checks
It is possible that our main results are driven by the choice of parametrization we made.
To see how our results are a⁄ected by changes in model speci￿cation and parameterization,
we conduct some robustness checks by relaxing several assumptions in the simulation.16
First, we relax the assumption that the import demand elasticity, amd2, is constant across
industries; we now assume that it is normally distributed with mean 1:5027 and standard
error 0:3705, which are the sample mean and standard deviation of the import price elas-
ticities in the GB￿ s data. We simulate the SP model and then estimate equation (14) with
the same instruments as those in earlier simulation/estimation exercises. The OLS, 3SLS1,
and 3SLS2 results are presented in columns 1-3 of Table 5, respectively. Regardless of the
estimation methods, all the coe¢ cient estimates are consistent with the PFS hypothesis,
i.e., ￿ < 0, ￿ > 0, and ￿+￿ > 0. Note that the estimates of ￿ are lower than those obtained
for the constant import price elasticity (see columns 6-8 of Table 2). This is as expected
because higher elasticity leads to higher variation of imports and together with the uniform
quota level, would result in higher probability of protection, which would generate negative
correlation between z=e and the NTB coverage ratio for politically organized industries.
We further allow for correlation between the home goods demand and imports which
we observe in the data. Speci￿cally, we set correlation between home goods demand shock
and import demand shock to be 0:636.17 As columns 4-6 of Table 5 show, our main results
do not change; all of the results are in support of the PFS hypothesis. We also checked for
the robustness of our results to changes in the following parameters; we either increased or
decreased a subset of the parameters by 20% (home goods demand, home goods supply,
16We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting us to do the robustness checks done in this
section.
17This number is taken from the correlation between log consumption and log import in data used by
Facchini et al. (2006).
23Table 5: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 3SLS1 3SLS2 OLS 3SLS1 3SLS2
￿0 0:191 0:189 0:186 0:175 0:138 0:164
(0:007) (0:012) (0:008) (0:007) (0:011) (0:008)
￿ ￿12:5 ￿74:1 ￿30:8 ￿14:8 ￿58:6 ￿39:7
(2:65) (8:74) (4:40) (3:67) (10:3) (5:88)
￿ 17:8 113:9 49:3 37:0 132:0 82:7
(3:05) (11:9) (5:74) (3:94) (13:1) (7:11)
￿ 562:6 87:15 202:21 269:66 75:31 120:44
￿L 0:7049 0:6508 0:6236 0:4006 0:4435 0:4797
Nobs 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(3), the im-
port demand elasticity is assumed to be normally distributed with mean
1.5027 and standard error 0.3705. In columns (4)-(6), home goods de-
mand shock and import demand shock are allowed to be correlated as
well (the correlation coe¢ cient is 0.636).
foreign goods demand and foreign goods supply parameters). In all those perturbations,
the parameter estimates were consistent with the PFS hypothesis. 18
7 Why the Simulation Results?
Why is it that we spuriously estimate a protection for sale e⁄ect from the simulated data?
In this section, we try to explain the reason by using an even simpler model of protection,
which does not have any aggregation over subindustries. Suppose that the demand for and
supply of home goods have no random component:
lnXHd
i = ahd1 + ahd2 lnpH
i ,
lnXHs
i = ahs1 + ahs2 lnpH
i .
18Those results are available upon request.













For imported goods in the same industry, however, demand and supply have random com-
ponents. Let
lnXMd
i = amd1 + amd2 lnpH
i + xmdi,
lnXMs
i = ams1 + ams2 lnpH
i + xmsi.









The parameters are set in such a way that the foreign goods equilibrium is as follows:
lnXM
i = ￿1:0 + 2:0Ui,
where Ui is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0,1]. This gives the desired level of
imports. Also, we set the uniform quota level, ^ Q = 1, so ln ^ Q = 0. As before, political
organization is random and there is a :5 chance of being organized. Protection occurs if
the quota is binding and the industry is organized. In this setting, if lnXM
i ￿ 0 and the
industry is organized, the coverage ratio (Ci) and the protection measure (Ci=(1 + Ci))
25are 1 and 0:5, respectively; otherwise, they are both zero.
Since the probability of being organized is :5, with a large enough number of industries,
half of them will be organized and half will not. For the half that are not organized, the






= 1 + zi = 1 +
1
e(￿1:0+2:0Ui).
For the other half of the industries, which are politically organized, it is:





Now consider that we have drawn 2000 industries. For a large enough sample size, in any
realization, roughly half will be organized. To illustrate the intuition, we take exactly half
to be organized. Number the non-organized (organized) industries by integers between 1
(1001) and 1000 (2000) with a higher index given to the industry with a larger Ui. Only
industries with an index above 1000 will ever get protection. As the number of draws gets
large enough, we would expect to see a uniform empirical distribution of the realizations
of Ui: To capture this in ￿gures below, we place one ￿rm at each integer. That is, we
assume that industry i has Ui = i=1000 for i = 1;:::;1000, and Ui = (i ￿ 1000)=1000 for
i = 1001;:::;2000. Industries with an index higher than or equal to 1500 will have the quota
invoked and be binding while industries with an index below the cuto⁄, while organized,
never have the quota invoked.
Figure 1 plots the Ui and the import quantity. Notice that for industry i = 1001;:::;2000,
which are politically organized, the quota binds and import quantity equals the quota when
26Ui is large (industries 1500 to 2000).
(Figure 1 in here)
Figure 2 plots the protection measure, Ci=(1 + Ci). It is 0:5 for industries with index 1500
to 2000 which are politically organized and whose quota is binding.
(Figure 2 in here)
Figure 3 plots 1+ zi. As we can see, this is high for industries with small imports and low
for those with large imports. It is constant for industries with index 1500 to 2000 because
of the binding quota.
(Figure 3 in here)
We next plot the 1 + zi times the political organization dummy in Figure 4. Notice that
for industries 1 to 1000, it is zero because they are never politically organized.
(Figure 4 in here)
Now we ￿t the protection measure in Figure 2 by using (1 + zi) (Figure 3) and Ii(1+zi)









(1 + zi) + 0:0921
(0:0035)
Ii (1 + zi),
where standard errors are in parentheses. Note that b ￿ and b ￿ have opposite signs as in the
PFS model. There seems to be a positive correlation between protection and (1 + zi) for
politically organized industries but a negative one for unorganized industries. This is what
27the regression is picking up.
We can con￿rm this insight by looking at the regression results from a di⁄erent angle,
i.e., by using the partitioned regression. Let RIPi be the component of (1 + zi) that is
orthogonal to Ii (1 + zi). It is obtained by regressing (1 + zi) on the constant term and
Ii (1 + zi) and then taking the residual. The thin line in Figure 5 plots this orthogonal
component.
(Figure 5 in here)
Due to the properties of the partitioned regression, the coe¢ cients of the OLS regression
of the protection measure on the orthogonal component gives the coe¢ cient on (1 + zi)
back. As can be seen from the ￿gure, the orthogonal component of (1 + zi) is negatively
correlated with the protection measure, which is the reason for the negative coe¢ cient of
the (1 + zi) in the original OLS.
Similarly, let RIIPi be the component of Ii (1 + zi) that is orthogonal to (1 + zi). It is
dipicted as the thin line in Figure 6.
(Figure 6 in here)
As is clear from the ￿gure, the orthogonal component of Ii(1 + zi) is positively correlated
with the protection measure. This accounts for the positive coe¢ cient of Ii(1 + zi) in the
original regression.
The qualitative aspects of the results do not change when we use IV estimation with
Ui and U2
i as instruments. ￿ and ￿ are estimated to be ￿0:610 and 1:008 along with the
standard errors of 0:280 and 0:645, respectively. In this case, not only are the signs right
but b ￿ + b ￿ > 0, which is even more consistent with the PFS model.
Conventional studies in trade estimating the political economy e⁄ects use NTBs as a
28proxy for tari⁄ protection measures, even though NTBs could be better interpreted as
quotas. Our results suggest that the real reason behind evidence in support of the PFS
model could be the di⁄erence between the quota being binding and non-binding. That is,
￿Ii (1 + zi) with ￿ > 0 ￿ts well for the industries under quota (1500 to 2000) and industries
that are not politically organized (1 to 1000), but does not ￿t well for industries that are
politically organized but not under quota (1001 to 1499). On the other hand, ￿(1+zi) with
￿ < 0 ￿ts well for politically organized industries since those with high equilibrium imports
face binding quotas, but ￿ts very poorly for those that are not politically organized. Hence,
it is natural that combining both would give the best ￿t, and these results correspond to
the signs obtained by GM, GB, and others. Similar interpretations can be o⁄ered for the
tari⁄ version.
8 Which Model is More Plausible?
We have shown that (1) data simulated from the SP model are reasonably close to actual
data and (2) estimation of the protection equation using the simulated data provides co-
e¢ cients that are consistent with those predicted by the PFS framework. This suggests
that numerous past ￿ndings in favor of the PFS model are also in favor of the SP model.
Clearly, estimation of the PFS protection equation is insu¢ cient to conclude the validity
of the PFS model.
Given our results along with past ￿ndings in the literature, it is important to ask which
model is (more) correct.19 Recently, Imai et al. (2008) present some quantile regression
and IV quantile regression results where the dependent variable is the protection measure
and the RHS variable is the inverse import penetration ratio. They argue that the signs of
the estimated coe¢ cients at high quantiles are not consistent with those predicted by the
19We thank the associate editor for raising the issue.
29PFS model. On the other hand, in this paper, we show that the coe¢ cient estimates are
indeed in line with the prediction of the SP model.
Imai et al. (2008) recently propose a new approach to testing the PFS model. An im-
portant feature of their approach is that it does not require the classi￿cation of industries
into organized and unorganized ones20. Their approach relies heavily on observables and
exploits the following prediction of the PFS model: politically organized industries should
have higher protection than unorganized ones given the inverse import penetration ratio
and other control variables. This suggests that industries with higher protection are more
likely to be politically organized, and thus for those industries, one should expect a positive
relationship between the inverse import penetration ratio and the protection measure. Imai
et al. (2008) provide a formal proof of this argument within the framework of recent works
on quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) and instrumental variable quantile re-
gression (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004a; 2004b; 2006). Their proposition (Proposition
1) essentially states that in the quantile regression of t=(1 + t) on z=e, the coe¢ cient on
z=e should be close to (￿ + ￿) at the quantile close to 1. To empirically examine this, they
use quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) and estimate the following equation:
QT (￿jZ) = ￿(￿) + ￿ (￿)Z=10000, (15)
where ￿ denotes quantile, T = t=(1 + t), Z = z=e, and QT (￿jZ) is the conditional ￿-th
quantile function of T. If the PFS model is correct, it is expected that ￿ (￿) converges
to (￿ + ￿) > 0 as ￿ approaches to 1 from below. Using the data from Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000), Imai et al. (2008) ￿nd that the null hypothesis of ￿ (￿) = 0 cannot
be rejected at high quantiles (in fact, all quantiles) in favor of the one-sided alternative
20Imai et al. (2008) also argue that the conventional classi￿caton of political organization by Goldberg and
Magee (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) are inconsistent with the PFS model, and relying
on those arbitrary classi￿cation could result in wrong coe¢ cient estimates of the protection equation.
30of ￿ (￿) > 0. Moreover, the point estimates indicate that contrary to the PFS prediction,
(￿ + ￿) are all negative at high quantiles and decrease as goes from 0:4 to 0:9. The results
do not provide any evidence favoring the PFS model.
In the quantile regression, Z is assumed to be an exogenous variable. However, Z is
likely to be endogenous as discussed in the literature and hence the parameter estimates
of the quantile regression are likely to be inconsistent. Imai et al. (2008) therefore allow
for the potential endogeneity of Z. They formally show that even in the presence of this
endogeneity, the main prediction of the PFS model in terms of their quantile approach
does not change. See Imai et al. (2008) for the relevant proposition (Proposition 2). To
test the prediction in the presence of possible endogeneity of Z, they estimate the following
equation by using IV quantile regression (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004a; 2004b; 2006):
P(T ￿ ￿(￿) + ￿ (￿)Z=10000jW) = ￿, (16)
where W is a set of instrumental variables. As in the quantile regression, Imai et al. (2008)
￿nd that the null hypothesis of ￿ (￿) = 0 in favor of the one-sided alternative cannot be
rejected. The point estimates are not favorable for the PFS model, either; even after
correcting for the endogeneity of Z, the estimate of at the highest quantile is not positive
as required by the PFS model. Imai et al. (2008) also show the robustness of their ￿ndings;
regardless of which instrument they use and whether they control for capital-labor ratio, the
null hypothesis at the highest quantile cannot be rejected. Moreover, the point estimates
of ￿ (￿) are negative at high quantiles; in fact, zero at low quantiles and negative at any
other quantiles, which is inconsistent with the PFS￿ s prediction.
Next, we examine the empirical validity of the SP model. We conduct the following
exercise: using simulated data from the SP model, we estimate equations (15) and (16).
We ask whether the parameter estimates from the simulated data resemble those reported
31in Imai et al. (2008). If the SP model is valid, then the patterns exhibited in the former
are expected to be similar to those in the latter. The results are presented in Table 6. The
coe¢ cients on Z are found to be zero at lower quantiles and thereafter negative, which is
consistent with those in Imai et al. (2008).
Table 6: Quantile Regression Results
SP Imai et al. (2008)
￿ (quantile) ￿(￿) ￿(￿) ￿(￿) ￿ (￿)
0:1 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:004) 0:000 (0:056)
0:2 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:005) 0:000 (0:079)
0:3 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:223) 0:000 (0:006) 0:000 (0:091)
0:4 0:003 (0:029) 0:020 (2:639) 0:000 (0:006) 0:000 (0:097)
0:5 0:139 (0:055) ￿3:190 (5:087) 0:002 (0:006) ￿0:003 (0:099)
0:6 0:311 (0:049) ￿6:320 (6:061) 0:028 (0:006) ￿0:046 (0:098)
0:7 0:399 (0:023) ￿4:332 (5:466) 0:077 (0:010) ￿0:126 (0:095)
0:8 0:443 (0:013) ￿1:374 (3:928) 0:157 (0:026) ￿0:258 (0:094)
0:9 0:498 (0:012) ￿1:048 (2:569) 0:308 (0:040) ￿0:505 (0:089)
Note: We estimated on the 250 simulated industries. The results are the averates of
100 simulation/estimation exercises. Standard errors are in parenthese. The results
in the last column is from Imai et al. (2008) Table 2, column 5.
Similar results are obtained for the IV quantile regression (Table 7). It is also notewor-
thy that the size of ￿￿ s is by and large similar with that obtained by Imai et al. (2008)
when they use three instruments highly correlated with Z.
The results overall suggest that the feature of the SP model is more consistent with the
actual data than the PFS model. The intuition behind the negative coe¢ cient estimate
of the SP model is simple. A surge in imports, which increases the import penetration
ratio, tends to result in the quota being binding, which corresponds to an increase in the
NTB coverage ratio. A similar mechanism has been considered in the literature. Findlay
and Wellisz (1982), for example, argued that an increase in import in an industry triggers
lobbying e⁄orts which result in higher protection. That is, like in the SP model, a negative
32Table 7: IV Quantile Regression Results
SP Imai et al. (2008)
￿ (quantile) ￿(￿) ￿(￿) ￿(￿) ￿ (￿)
0:1 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:004) 0:000 (0:000)
0:2 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:009) ￿0:000 (0:000)
0:3 0:000 (0:001) 0:000 (0:196) ￿0:018 (0:018) ￿17:81 (23:37)
0:4 0:011 (0:046) ￿1:105 (5:373) ￿0:021 (0:019) ￿7:160 (12:05)
0:5 0:137 (0:060) ￿3:965 (6:421) ￿0:019 (0:026) ￿7:180 (14:49)
0:6 0:308 (0:049) ￿7:575 (6:698) ￿0:033 (0:026) ￿8:500 (13:08)
0:7 0:405 (0:024) ￿6:430 (6:048) ￿0:043 (0:027) ￿3:890 (6:624)
0:8 0:445 (0:013) ￿2:640 (4:877) ￿0:029 (0:049) ￿4:970 (7:401)
0:9 0:495 (0:014) ￿1:135 (3:529) 0:079 (0:070) ￿5:780 (7:446)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthese. The results in the last column is from Imai
et al. (2008) Table 3, column (11).
relationship is predicted between the change in inverse import penetration ratio and the
NTB coverage ratio. This prediction is indeed borne out in the data; Tre￿ er (1993) found
that the relationship between import penetration ratio and protection is insigni￿cant but
a change in import penetration has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on protection.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the usual tests of the PFS model are actually also consistent
with a simpler model, which we call "Surge Protection" model, where protection tends
to occur when imports surge and the industry is organized. We then showed that the
Surge Protection model is more consistent with the data when we look at the relationship
between the level of protection at various conditional quantiles and inverse penetration
ratio divided by the import demand elasticity. The relationship is found to be negative at
higher quantiles in the SP model, which is consistent with that in the data, whereas it is
predicted to be positive by the PFS model. An important implication our results provide
33is that there is no puzzle regarding the high weight on welfare generated by the "tests" of
the PFS model, since the Surge Protection model does not allow ￿ and ￿ to be used to
construct a weight on welfare placed by the government.
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